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Abstract. Denmark and Sweden take two-fold 
positions on the question whether shale gas 
should be developed. At first sight, it appears 
the governments are supportive by licencing 
exploration to domestic and foreign compa-
nies. However, Denmark has suspended issu-
ance of new licenses as doubts of extraction 
activities have risen. Sweden was forced to 
give landowners and municipalities a say in 
decision-making, and there is a larger context 
of mining minerals policy controversy. Even 
though both countries only have exploration 
activities at the moment, and the economic promise is yet un-
clear, public awareness and attention are increasing and cause 
difficulties for governments and industry to proceed without open 
discussions and debates. Scandinavia’s green image is at stake 
as the new fossil fuel opportunities are in conflict with the ambi-
tious goals for renewable energy development. Both countries 
now have to prioritise energy self-sufficiency and industrial 
economics versus ecological consciousness.  
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Introduction 
Acceptance of shale gas development may be increasing in Eu-
rope. Rising energy costs, better public understanding of the 
issue and fear of losing economic competitiveness contribute to a 
positive view. However, many people are still reflexively op-
posed, deeply concerned with environmental and other risks, e.g. 
seismic activity (vulgo earthquakes). The debate about the devel-
opment of unconventional gas is continuing and is increasingly 
characterised by informed participants, leading to more informed 
decision-making (Seaton, 2013).  
There is no political consensus at EU level (Eberhardt et al., 
2013). For the time being, member states govern through author-
isations and permits as well as general legislation in the field of 
prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons 
(Philippe & Partners, 2011). 
In Scandinavia, Alum Shale resources exist as one type of 
shale case occurrences. Sweden, it is estimated, contributes to  
these Scandinavian resources with 0.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) 
of technically recoverable shale gas. Denmark has 4.5 tcm shale 
gas in place. However, only 0.9 tcm of Danish resources are 
technically recoverable. Consequently, for the purpose of this 
article, only Denmark and Sweden will be analysed as they have 
the greatest potential among the Scandinavian Countries to go 
forward in producing shale in the near future. The map of figure 
1 shows current assessment of the region which comprises the 
Scandinavian potentials for shale gas. As it is shown in the illus-
tration, most of Denmark and large parts of Southern Sweden are 
considered to have shale gas occurrences. Most of the area has 
been classified as Alum Shale with characteristics of being shal-
low, thin and immature (ARI, 2013). 
In concerns to Sweden, licence-holders include Gripen Gas 
AB, Energigas and Tekniska Verken Linköping AB. All are 
active in south-central Sweden. Shell AB has been most active in 
Southern Sweden between 2008 and 2011 (ARI, 2013). These 
firms’ activities have provoked significant public worries and 
anti-fracking activism. This poses moderate operational and 
security risks to shale gas development (Control Risks’ Offices, 
2012).  
Immense objection to Shell plans caused major public pressure 
to give municipalities the right to veto drilling. The Swedish 
government decided to review and evaluate the Minerals’ Act 
which regulates the prospection, exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons, including shale gas (Philippe & Partners, 2011).  
In the case of Denmark, however, has stopped issuing new li-
censes. Before, in 2010, the government granted two licenses to 
Total E&P Denmark B.V., a subsidiary of the French Total com-
pany, to conduct research surveys, followed by test drillings in 
the areas of Northern Zealand and Northern Jutland which are 
supposed to last for six years (ARI, 2013; Eberhardt et al., 2013).  
Depending on the results, Denmark will decide on further poli-
cy at a later point of time. Anti-fracking activism is moderate in 
Denmark; protest is rather unorganised and receives little media 
attention (Madsen, Have, Woodrow, Olsen, 2012). But the Dan-
ish public certainly cares about environmental and energy issues. 
This leads to political and security risks to unconventional gas 
development (Control Risks’ Offices, 2012). 
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Scandinavia has generally shown reluctance to engage with the 
question whether unconventional gas should be developed. As it 
is well known, the Scandinavian countries are determined to be 
international climate policy leaders and be very ambitious about 
the transformation of their energy sectors, replacing fossil fuel by 
renewable energy as quickly as possible which will be shown 
later in this article. Both Sweden and Denmark show no rush in 
this sector, though both have licenced domestic and foreign firms 
to explore promising fields. The attitude of both governments 
may be seen as relatively neutral and cautious at the moment. 
Responding to a growing public debate and the rise of a critical 
anti-fracking movement is rather contained as well. 
 
 
Figure 1: Area of technically recoverable shale oil and shale gas 
resources in Scandinavia (ARI – Advanced Resouces 
International, 2013).  
 
This article reviews political and public positions of Denmark 
and Sweden in relation to unconventional gas. Its aim is to show 
how shale gas development is dealt with. This examination in-
cludes the legal framework regarding exploration and exploita-
tion of shale gas occurrences, as well as the projects of operating 
companies in this field. The public opinion dynamics and critical 
voices that have evolved from these issues are highlighted con-
sequently. Some suggestions on future developments are offered 
in the final part of this article. 
It is expected that the two countries will more or less consist-
ently show a rather reluctant to dismissive position towards any 
further shale gas exploration and consequently also towards 
exploitation. Issues like being treated as a world leader in green 
attitude and energy development are not only in the mindset of 
policy makers in these countries, they already became part of the 
general character of Scandinavia. Thus, a new earth-exploiting 
format seems to be a challenge in many ways, as it is shown in 
the course of this article. The likelihood of changing over current 
energy strategies is evaluated in this article’s conclusions. 
Denmark:  
Shale Gas as Transition Fuel? 
The map of figure 2 gives an idea in which regions of Den-
mark potential shale gas extraction is plausible. “Sweet spots” 
are those areas which are characterised as organic-rich zones 
where gas extraction is possible given the geological features 
those areas show. “Non-sweet spots” do not provide good poten-
tial for future shale gas development (Durham University, 2012). 
Notably, those sweet spots lying in a depth of below five kilo-
metres are considerably harder to reach than those spots above 
this level. Light green areas therefore seem to be the most attrac-
tive for shale gas exploration and exploitation. The north of 
Denmark along with the island Seeland (Zealand), home to the 
capital Copenhagen, show the most onshore extraction opportu-
nities for this type of unconventional gas development. Based on 
research by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013), 
a total of 4.5 trillion cubic metres is expected to lie in the Danish 
grounds, but only around 0.9 tcm could be accessible by extract-
ing it through fracking and therefore being technically recovera-
ble. For Denmark itself, an area of around 17,400 million m² is 
predicted for a depth of below 1,000 m. The depths where shale 
gas is expected goes down to even 4,500 m in total (ARI, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2: Danish shale gas in the Alum Shale, with “sweet spot” 
depths (NGU, NAG Directors Meeting, 2013). 
 
Considering the fact that the development and extraction of 
shale gas seems to be a real possibility in Denmark, several 
groups of interests have grown rapidly, representing different 
concerns in regard to the topic. In general, it is possible to identi-
fy three main stakeholder groups that either have an interest in 
shale gas development or are affected by it in a certain way. 
Firstly, the government forms a stakeholder as it, for instance, 
gives the framework for the development of shale gas. Secondly, 
the industry has commercial interests and finally the general 
public, consisting of several smaller stakeholders wants to have a 
say in the related decisions as well. 
Government policy approach and legal framework 
Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s current government 
is a coalition of Social Democrats, Social Liberals and the So-
cialist People’s Party. It has parliamentary support by the Red-
Green Alliance. Since winning the 2011 election, this govern-
ment has taken a much stronger ecological position than its 
predecessor, Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s right-leaning government 
coalition of the liberal-conservative Venstre and the Conserva-
tives. The Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building is headed by 
Martin Ledegaard and is basically responsible for the administra-
tion of energy supply legislation, whereas application is handled 
by the Danish Energy Agency (Danish Ministry of Climate, 
Energy and Building, 2013). The agency is responsible for na-
tional and international production, supply and consumption of 
energy as well as efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(Danish Energy Agency, 2013). Obviously, the environment 
ministry and its agencies also have a say in energy matters. 
Denmark is very determined to design its energy policy around 
a stimulating approach for renewable energy sources. The gov-
ernment has established ambitious goals for 2050. For instance, 
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by 2020, more than 35 percent in final energy consumption 
should be supplied by renewable energy sources, 50 percent of 
electricity consumption by wind power; other aims include a 
reduction of gross energy consumption of 7.6 percent in compar-
ison to 2010 and 34 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sion in relation to 1990. Denmark’s ultimate goal is to have 100 
percent renewable energy in the energy and transport sectors by 
2050. The agreement established to hold and support these tar-
gets includes 62 actions to enable Denmark to reach its aims. 
They cover areas such as energy efficiency, renewable energy for 
electricity production and usage in households and industries, 
policies regarding heating and research and development, includ-
ing financing aspects (Danish Energy Agency, 2012). 
Shale gas, in this context, tends to be seen as a bridging or 
transition energy source. “Shale gas can be a significant step 
toward a green transition”, the DEA’s International Director 
Hans Jørgen Koch has stated. “If we have access to more shale 
gas, it will help replace coal.” (Total, 2013c). However, it would 
take much capital to produce shale gas, so profitability is in 
question. The actual point of making a profit with shale gas 
depends on too many factors and the initial investment that is 
made might take years to be reimbursed. 
A key part of the economic equation is the decline of natural 
gas production in the North Sea. Denmark has been extracting 
offshore gas since the early 1980s, and this has made the country 
practically independent of gas imports. This could change quick-
ly, and Denmark is expected to become a gas importer by the 
early 2020s unless alternatives can be found. This would have 
consequences for the country’s finances, both in terms of addi-
tional cost for imports and a loss of revenue from domestic pro-
duction.  
Energy and climate minister Martin Lidegaard has explained:  
[T]ransition away from fossil fuels will take time, which is why oil 
and gas will play a role for many more years. In the meantime tax 
revenue from the oil and gas production will benefit Danish society 
and our welfare. […] Production of natural gas from the North Sea 
will continue, though all estimates show a general decline over the 
next 10-20 years. But new resources are still being found and de-
veloped in Denmark, and we’re planning a new licensing round in 
the Danish part of the North Sea that is to be opened in 2013 (Natu-
ral Gas Europe, 2012) 
Regulatory frameworks for the Danish oil and gas market are 
organised in two areas: licensing rounds and an “open door” 
procedure. Most Western parts of the North Sea, i.e. offshore 
fields, are subject to licensing rounds whereas the entire onshore 
region and remaining parts of offshore areas are structured by an 
“open door” procedure (Danish Energy Agency, 2013). Possible 
shale gas areas of Denmark fall into the “open door” category, by 
which companies can apply for licenses for a certain region 
expected to hold this type of unconventional gas. The procedure 
is based on a first-come, first-served policy. Up to June 2012 
companies were able to apply for Danish areas with the purpose 
of developing shale gas. However, from this point of time on, the 
government suspended further “new licenses for exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons in onshore areas where the target is 
natural gas in shale layers”. It reasoned that first, research for 
safe and environmentally friendly shale gas production should be 
fostered at first (Danish Energy Agency, 2013).  
In 2010, Rasmussen’s liberal-conservative government gave 
two licenses to a subsidiary of the French company Total, Total 
E&P Denmark BV, which controls 80 percent of the licences, 
while Nordsøfonden (North Sea Fund), the Danish State’s oil and 
gas company, owns a mandatory 20 percent share. Licences are 
for investigations and test drillings to evaluate potential shale gas 
occurrences on Danish grounds. Both parties committed to a 
work programme by accepting the license to explore the given 
areas within a certain time frame. In this specific case, only one 
exploration well per area is granted for research purposes. The 
aim of the exploration drillings is to find out whether the ex-
pected gas occurrences are sufficient and economically viable. 
As the Danish government participates in the tests by means of 
Nordsøfonden, it does not entirely give up control to the foreign 
French energy colossus (Van Waes, 2013). 
Exploration in Nordjylland and Nordsjaelland  
Total is the only company that currently holds licenses in 
Denmark for shale gas development purposes, at the Northern tip 
of mainland Denmark and on the Nordsjaelland island South of 
the Kattegat and West of the Danish Straits. Total has stated that 
there might be about five times as much shale gas onshore as the 
country has produced from the North Sea fields. Chances of 
finding commercially interesting quantities have been estimated 
to be about 20 percent. If exploration proves a success, produc-
tion might start in 2020 (Total Group, 2013c). Total’s license 
areas are mapped in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Danish licenses of Total Group (2013). 
 
The energy giant was given six years for its research objec-
tives, divided into three distinct phases where each phase has to 
show valid results for further appraisal processes. The first phase 
has already been completed and included preliminary studies 
from 2010 to 2012 where geological studies had to show the 
potential of shale gas occurrences in the selected areas. The 
research of this phase was conducted by means of existing data, 
source rock samples from outside the licensed areas, reprocessed 
data from seismic surveys, and drill cutting from past drilling in 
the areas of interest (Total Group, 2013). 
The purpose of these tests was to find out how the rock would 
react to fracking. This can be estimated by the source rock thick-
ness, organic contents of the rock and its mineral composition. 
The current, second phase comprises technical feasibility studies 
from 2012 to 2014. It is meant to confirm data by exploratory 
drilling and to give detailed information on the reservoir and its 
gas volumes.  
In order to do so, first drilling in a vertical exploration well 
take place, as mentioned before, to take samples and conduct 
parameter measurements. Production tests are supposed to take 
place after the test drillings. Environmental and social impact 
studies, authorisation processes and the collection of additional 
seismic data are also included in this phase. Any further process-
es will then depend on the estimated quantity of gas, the fracking 
tests and further formerly unknown characteristics of the area. 
The last phase will start in 2014 and concerns the economic 
feasibility of fracking activities in the selected reservoirs. This 
includes evaluation of resources needed for the extraction, test 
drilling on horizontal levels, and a technical feasibility study. If 
all three phases show predicted positive results, Total will be 
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able to apply for a production license, depending on own assess-
ments and motivation to further proceed or not (Total Group, 
2013). 
The Nordjylland (Northern Jutland) project has concluded 
phase one. However, a lack of drilling rigs has delayed continu-
ing with phase two as originally planned (Van Waes, 2013). In 
addition, delays in Nordjylland have been caused by demands for 
environmental impact reviews coming from the Frederik-
shavn municipality. This seems to have come about through local 
political pressure from environmental groups and activists. In-
deed, the opposition group “Skifergas – Nej Tak” claims that this 
was a “first victory under our belts,” encouraging the group to 
work toward a national ban on fracking (Skifergas Nej Tak, 
2013). Meanwhile, construction of a drilling platform is sup-
posed to be concluded by May 2014, making the rig operational 
(Holm, 2013). 
The Nordsjaelland (Northern Zealand) project also reached 
phase two, and the rock formations are now subject to intensive 
research by the company. Nevertheless, Total has not yet drilled 
in this area either, as test and production drillings are only 
planned for phase three (Total Group, 2013).  
 
Public policy and public opinion  
In 2011, the issue of shale gas and its extraction was rarely 
discussed by the broad public in Denmark. The general media 
did not show great interest in the topic either; only the trade press 
followed foreign developments in regard to shale gas and frack-
ing (PISM, 2011). As the new projects unfolded, however, criti-
cism voiced that the only licence-holder, Total, made too little 
effort in public communications. Critics suggested that Total 
does not want the public to become aware and might be afraid of 
too much attention. According to one researcher, the company 
argued that the number of employees assigned to the project is 
simply too small to constantly keep the public informed. Fur-
thermore, only test drillings take place at the moment which 
should not put the public into unrest as they are not considered as 
harmful (Van Waes, 2013). 
Nevertheless, since December 2012, the firm has published a 
dedicated website, “Skifergas i Danmark” (skifergas.dk) in Dan-
ish and English with background information and news about its 
two projects. The site also explains the economic prospects for 
shale gas for Denmark and internationally. Since October 2013, a 
newsletter subscription is available. An exemplary screenshot of 
the website is shown in figure 4. 
This effort should be understood in the context of political de-
velopments in the year 2012. In early 2012, energy minister 
Martin Ledegaard realised that no debate had risen in parliament 
or in the public. It should be noted that Denmark has a strong 
tradition in its political culture to build parliamentary and public 
consensus on long-term questions such as infrastructure and 
investment-intensive energy policy. After several meetings and 
technical briefings with the head of the Parliamentary Commis-
sion on Energy, the minister decided not to continue granting 
further licenses in regard to shale gas. However, Total could 
proceed with its current licenses.  
The thrust of the minister’s initiative aimed at clarifying the 
environmental conditions for responsible extraction before any 
new commitments could be made. Ledegaard stated: 
If commercially interesting quantities of shale gas are found in Den 
mark, it will only be produced if it can be done in an environmen-
tally sound way. The fact is that today we don’t know whether we 
can produce natural gas from shale in the Danish subsoil. Explora-
tion is at a very early stage […] I’m well aware of possible issues in 
relation to protection of the environment in exploring for and pro-
ducing shale gas. Before we approve a drilling programme for an 
exploration well, all issues in relation to protection of the environ-
ment and safety in general will be dealt with to safeguard such an 
operation. All precautions will be taken in order to protect any 
groundwater resources.  (Natural Gas Europe, 2012) 
For late 2013, the minister had plans to call for further meet-
ings to evaluate the Danish results and experiences from abroad 
to discuss whether new licenses should be given out or not (Van 
Waes, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 4: Total E&P Denmark’s public information website, 
“Skifergas i Danmark” at www.skifergas.dk. An English version 
is available at en.skifergas.dk 
 
The topic still does not receive as much attention by the broad 
Danish public as some smaller stakeholders wish they would. 
Among these are a few non-governmental organisations, includ-
ing Greenpeace Denmark, WWF Denmark, the Danish Society 
for Nature Conversation and “Skifergas – Nej Tak” (Van Waes, 
2013). They mainly take an opposing position.  
Concito, a green think-tank which analyses transition opportu-
nities towards a climate-neutral Denmark without engaging in 
commercial or political interests, has published a report “Shale 
gas – good for the climate?” which received moderate attention 
and was intended to increase public debate. Concito emphasized 
the report  did not come from a fundamental anti-fracking posi-
tion but rather tried to promote a neutral and knowledge-based 
approach on dealing with shale gas; it clearly recognized that the 
U.S. has been able to strongly decrease carbon dioxide emission, 
replacing coal by natural gas. Shale gas was analysed as being 
more desirable than biomass because of environmental impacts.  
Concito also pointed out that some public discussed issues 
have been based on misinformation; specifically, the film docu-
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mentary “Gasland” was criticized for poor and incorrect infor-
mation and propagandistic motives. People should be open 
minded and rely on more trustworthy and non-biased sources 
(Concito, 2013). 
 However, Concito’s managing director Thomas Færgeman 
downplayed certain pro-shale arguments in a later editorial and 
stated that in the context of Europe,  
under current market conditions, shale gas will have no climate 
benefits. Only under certain political and market conditions that 
ensured that it replaced coal, would it be beneficial, but that would 
require either a significantly higher price for carbon quotas or coal, 
or lower gas prices. If none of these conditions are met, then shale 
gas would only result in a higher European consumption of fossil 
fuels and increased carbon emissions. (Færgeman, 2013) 
Færgeman insisted that it is technically possible to keep ex-
traction emissions to a minimum, “but it must be written into law 
or into extraction licences.” Environmental impact assessments 
would be a must. In any case, shale gas would be unlikely to lead 
to greenhouse gas emissions reductions, “since any shale gas 
extracted in the EU would to a large degree only be replacing 
imported natural gas” (Færgeman, 2013). His critical conclusion 
was 
the question of whether to extract shale gas then becomes a political 
decision based not on environmental considerations, but on foreign 
energy dependence and the potential financial gain from the sale of 
shale gas. At a time when scientists tell us that our fossil fuels must 
actually stay in the ground if we are to avoid catastrophic climate 
change, politicians would only be gambling with the planet’s future 
if they went ahead and decided to increase the availability of fossil 
fuels on the world market. (Færgeman, 2013) 
As public debate in Denmark slowly picks up speed on the 
question, it can be expected that such arguments, promoted by 
the influential environmental groups in the country, plus the 
growing protest movement, will be considered very seriously. 
Sweden:  
Mining Issues Beyond Shale 
The Alum Shale brings also Sweden on the map as a potential 
unconventional gas producer. Alum Shale gas is dry and in Swe-
den it is 1,000-2,100 m deep. Thus, recoverable Alum Shale gas 
reserves are estimated at about 0.3 trillion cubic metres. The 
Alum Shale in southern Sweden contains the black organic as 
well as the black and gray (dark brown) lithotypes. These litho-
types are important shale source rocks (ARI, 2013). 
Government policy and legal framework  
Sweden has an energy supply situation quite different from 
Denmark, which is reflected by government policy. It traditional-
ly relies on nuclear power and hydropower for electricity genera-
tion, both of which make for very low CO2 emissions. Sweden 
has a very large potential for non-fossil fuel, renewable energy 
production such as biomass. The country has fairly low demand 
for natural gas and does not import much; it also has not much of 
a gas grid infrastructure. Sweden’s energy supply has only a 
three percent natural gas share (Bosson, 2013).  
Although Sweden is known for a relatively high energy con-
sumption in Europe, energy engineering consultancy DNV notes 
that “the need for unconventional gas development is somehow 
limited in a country with this type of energy mix” (Stahl, 2011). 
In relation to the EU Strategy 2020 and regarding significant 
protests against shale gas extraction, the Swedish government 
reviewed and evaluated its Mineral Strategy in 2011/12. The 
Swedish Mineral Act is related to exploration permits and to 
mine concession minerals.  Concession minerals are defined as 
certain mineral substances and industrial minerals – and therefore 
include oil and shale gas. The exploration permits give the holder 
the exclusive right to prospecting exploration. Thus, the holder 
has the obligation to create a work plan. The permit also gives 
the right to the landowners to submit comments on the work 
plan. Moreover, the act specifies that provisions about conces-
sion minerals are based on a common national interest in mining 
and the minerals industry. This means the mineral deposits have 
to be of an economically profitable quality, and the geographical 
location has to be suitable with the principles of natural resource 
management. The chief mining inspector of the Mining Inspec-
torate of Sweden holds the right to decide and may grant an 
exploitation concession (Government Offices of Sweden, 2012).  
The Mining Inspectorate is the official body for the admin-
istration of mineral resources in Sweden and therefore carries out 
inspections as well. It belongs to the Ministry of Industry, Em-
ployment and Communications and works closely together with 
the Geological Survey of Sweden (SGU Personn, 2010).  
Nevertheless, as the Scandinavian countries are known for 
their green attitude and as the use of chemicals is generally ap-
plicable for shale gas development, a prospected exploitation in 
Sweden has to be linked to the Environmental Code. 
The overall purpose is a sustainable development and a healthy 
environment. Therefore, the act evaluates the obligation to set 
“precautionary measures that are necessary to prevent, hinder or 
combat damage or detriment to human health or the en-
vironment” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2012). 
In terms of mining activities, this means the permit owner has 
to create a waste management plan and additionally a plan which 
carries out the activities for remediation. Furthermore, the reme-
diation has to be trustworthy by means of financial security. This 
will be decided on by the responsible officials of the Swedish 
Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications (Govern-
ment Offices of Sweden, 2012). 
An important role is taken by the public interest or a common 
national interest in Sweden, especially in regard to the environ-
ment and controversial projects, such as the ones involving hy-
draulic fracturing. Even if there are companies with exploration 
licences in Sweden, the government practically has given land-
owners the right of a veto.  
A reason lies in the significant protests that have arisen among 
the Swedish people and a debate about the risks of unconven-
tional gas extraction. But in general, the Minerals Act always 
links mining activities to the environment and the national inter-
est. There is, for instance, a mandatory consultation by the opera-
tor during the initial stage of mining activities. The consultation 
includes the supervising authorities and the public, so that vari-
ous stakeholders have the chance to make comments on the plan 
(Government Offices of Sweden, 2012). 
Exploration licences 
Four companies have received exploration licences in South 
and Central Sweden. Gripen Gas AB now has twelve authorisa-
tions for oil and gas exploration in Östergötland and Öland 
(Kalmar counties), an area which comprises around 583 km² 
(Gripen Gas AB, 2012 and 2013). Energigas received four li-
cences for exploration in Östergötland in Central Sweden. An-
other authorisation for an exploration project in Östergötland was 
given to Tekniska Verken Linköping AB. Shell AB obtained 
three exploration licences for Skåne in South Sweden (Phillipe & 
Partners, 2011). 
Gripen Gas has claimed some successes in exploring for shale 
gas and has emphasized that developing the resource could allow 
Sweden to move away from oil and nuclear energy dependency 
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(Gripen Gas AB, 2011). However, generally the news flow on 
Swedish industrial activity on unconventional gas exploration 
has been rather thin.  
The first project to start, Shell AB, was the focus of much at-
tention. The firm was initially very optimistic, saying its licence 
areas were promising and that there could be enough gas to cover 
Sweden's gas needs for at least ten years. The firm received 
licences in 2008/9 and began testing in 2010, immediately re-
ceiving public protests, lawsuits, and negative election-year 
statements from Social Democrat, Left and Green parties 
(Fouche, 2010). Upon disappointing results, Shell decided not to 
renew its exploration licenses in Sweden in 2011 (Gismatullin, 
2011). 
Gripen Gas received most of the exploration licences and is the 
principal gas explorer in Sweden. The firm’s activities will be 
used to give a general idea on how shale gas development is 
managed in Sweden. According to Gripen Gas, exploration of 
shale gas includes three stages to test whether gas exists and of 
which quality it is present. Firstly, the company has to identify 
where gas exists. The second stage is the drilling of shallow 
wells to test the quality of the rock. If the first two steps are 
successful, the last stage is carrying out test of the gas flow vol-
ume. Gripen Gas identifies the most likely gas locations in their 
exploration areas with data from the Geological Survey of Swe-
den (SGU). The engineers analyse relevant data to get infor-
mation about the possible gas deposits and its potential for pro-
ducing. Moreover, they get first information about the quality of 
the gas to judge whether the shale quality is suitable for trapping. 
The next step is drilling to test the quality of the rock and in a 
best case discovery of Alum Shale deposits. If the drilling is 
successful, the volume of the shale gas deposit will be measured. 
Since the Minerals Act links mining activities to the national 
interest in economically viable projects, good gas flow rates are 
necessary for a commercial shale trapping. Therefore, Gripen 
Gas carries out different short tests and may drill other wells 
during the last phase.  
Environmental aspects have to be taken into account. For this 
reason, Gripen Gas assures that hydraulic fracturing and the use 
of organic chemicals will be avoided. Instead, only water will be 
pumped down to cool the drilling bit while drilling and to en-
courage fractures in the Alum Shale. In certain cases with slant 
wells or near horizontal drilling, biodegradable mud may be 
used. Moreover, the company mentioned that it will not drill 
wells deeper than 150 m as “the Alunskiffer [Alum Shale] is 
shallow” (Gripen Gas, 2011). This stands in remarkable contrast 
to many other sources which see shale gas deposits in Sweden 
more around a depth of 1,000 to 2,100 metres (ARI, 2013).  
Sweden’s Environmental Code does not directly prohibit the 
use of chemicals while conducting mineral extraction activities. 
It may therefore be possible that Gripen Gas will, despite the 
assurances mentioned, select different methods and drill deeper 
in the future.  
Protests and public opinion 
Sweden has experienced significant protests against unconven-
tional gas projects and insufficient regulation as well as insuffi-
cient local community decision-making power. This is not too 
surprising given the influential role of environmental organisa-
tions and a dedication to local democracy and participation in the 
country. Typical concerns about shale gas extraction and frack-
ing are clearly present in Sweden, such as groundwater contami-
nation through chemicals and seismic activity, but also problems 
of general land use regimes, noise and light pollution, heavy 
traffic and other effects of unpopular industrial projects in rural 
areas. 
Shell AB, a subsidiary of the multinational Royal Dutch Shell 
Company, became a main target in the Southern region of Skåne, 
which by Swedish standards is a relatively densely populated 
area. Landowners and activist groups from diverse communities 
created a campaign platform, “Heaven or sHell,” to inform the 
public about Shell’s exploration plans, mobilise for protests, and 
circulate petitions (Heaven or sHell, 2013).  
Protests even included some sabotage at Shell’s project site, 
and the activists unsuccessfully tried court action against Shell, 
but the firm’s projects were cleared by judges (Simpson, 2010). 
The company organized local community meetings to explain its 
projects together with scientists; some of these meetings have 
been described as “stormy” as some neighbours which had not 
been invited tried a public confrontation; in addition, the “Heav-
en or sHell” campaign, led by major landowner Count Carl Piper, 
hired public relations firm Henrik Westander to take the issues 
from local to national level (Koop, 2012, p. 6-10).  
In 2010, the campaign used election year opportunities to stir 
political discussions, for example polling 300 candidates to state 
their opinion on shale gas and Shell’s activities. It was quite 
successful in framing the issue in terms of what level of govern-
ment should be enabled to make public decisions. Politicians 
showed considerable support for the idea that local, not central, 
bodies should have a say, even a right of veto (Sydsvenskan, 
2010). 
National environmentalist groups like Greenpeace Sweden, 
too, were and are active against shale gas development in Swe-
den. Such protests, which have included attempts to circulate 
petitions and involve the courts, created enough pressure to make 
the Swedish government review its energy minerals policy.  
However, it is necessary to put the debate in perspective. Shale 
gas extraction is just one issue among others, some much bigger, 
in Sweden’s mining debate. Sweden is a country with a tradition-
ally strong mining industry, and in 1992, legislation was passed 
to increase minerals production, support the sector with more 
liberal regulation and less cost, and grow government revenue. 
The hope was and is for an economic boom which could benefit 
underdeveloped parts of Sweden. The dynamics over two dec-
ades have resulted in a “mining free-for-all,” and recent new 
mining activities (e.g. iron and nickel) in Sweden’s high north 
have created much controversy at different levels. State agencies 
have at times been seen as too industry-friendly, as the govern-
ment even compared Sweden’s mining resources to Norway’s oil 
(Forssberg, 2013). Environmentalists have increased organized 
opposition. The political issues of whether and how citizens and 
local bodies can participate in project planning, and whether 
environmental protection is good enough, go far beyond any 
unconventional gas problems. Public attention has moved to-
wards different mining policy questions. Large demonstrations 
against the “mining boom” and for strict regulations in the gov-
ernment’s current review of Minerals Strategy took the streets in 
Stockholm and smaller cities in April 2013 (The Local, 2013). 
Controversy on shale gas, by contrast, has cooled off since the 
2010 election year activities. The early-2011 government chang-
es in mineral law and Shell’s 2011 exit have not been followed 
by any similar controversy.  
Public debate has been limited by the fact that the country, un-
like its neighbour Denmark, has few shale gas advocates in gov-
ernment or industry. Indeed, one public relations expert has 
described shale gas as a “non-issue” in Sweden, and few people – 
whether economists or energy specialists or environmentalists – 
know much about “fracking”. She explains: 
In Sweden, the largest Nordic energy consumer, shale gas is a non-
issue. One reason for this is that voters and consumers do not have 
a relationship to natural gas. Nine in ten Swedish towns and cities 
are located outside the natural gas grid. Households and kitchen 
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ranges that use gas can be found, but are viewed as something exot-
ic. (Bosson, 2013) 
Therefore, she claims that there is a lack of market interest in 
natural gas as a fuel. Policy ideas for investing in a national gas 
grid are relatively hopeless, as the combined heat and power 
market is claimed by waste fuels and bio fuels. She adds that for 
electricity production, “the doctrine on nuclear power is that it 
can only be replaced by renewable energy”. Combined with 
opposition to mining, she posits that for shale gas deposits, “it 
would be nearly politically impossible to extract them” as the 
“Swedish conscience might not accommodate fracking” (Bosson, 
2013). 
Conclusion 
The Danish and Swedish governments do see potential in shale 
gas extraction in the future as they allow test drillings in order to 
estimate the actual quantity of shale gas resources. The public 
has doubts about the opaque procedures to extract shale gas, as 
fundamental research seems to be insufficient. This lack of in-
formation causes concerns about how short and long-term effects 
have been considered by the operating parties so far.  
Scandinavian countries’ credibility as worldwide green leaders 
in energy production is also at stake. On the one hand, they are 
claiming to fast progress towards fossil fuel independence. On 
the other hand, Scandinavia considers opening up a new fossil 
fuel market to become more self-sufficient or to export surplus 
energy.  
Even if shale gas extraction should become more environmen-
tally friendly in terms of water usage and chemical supplements, 
the risk of occurring methane leakages is still not covered and 
adds up to a negative climate impact. All of these arguments 
simply are not in line with the conventional green attitude of the 
Nordic countries. It is entirely plausible that critical stakeholders 
demand an approach which clarifies the implications of the pro-
cess. Especially when so many stakeholders are involved, the 
understanding of the topic before it is transformed into an every-
day industrial activity is important. 
Denmark’s and Sweden’s cases show similarities but also dif-
ferences. Looking at Denmark, it is hard to forecast whether the 
state will allow fracking in the future. We expect that the country 
will put a priority on keeping its current position as a green 
innovator and make further investments in this area. Shale gas 
supply seems to have limited potential to convince a whole coun-
try to neglect its green energy policy approach, which finds 
strong support in the current government. Yet, Denmark has a 
growing economic mid- to long-term issue with its declining 
domestic gas production and a demand for gas. Arguments pro-
pose shale gas as a coal-replacing and imports-avoiding interim 
solution during transition to a fully renewable energy supply. 
In Sweden, we expect a higher readiness among the current 
government to allow fracking, as a legal framework is in place. 
The Minerals Act says if all requirements (work plan, environ-
mental code, and national interest) are fulfilled, exploration and 
production concessions are available. Community stakeholder 
rights, however, have become a red-hot issue in the larger mining 
debate. Politicians have been under a lot of pressure to grant 
local bodies a say on projects in the neighbourhood. Since this is 
essentially about the right to say no, or lay down restrictions and 
force negotiations, this may prove to be an obstacle for commer-
cial projects. These, however, do not progress much technically 
or economically. Shell’s exit is a case in point: the firm’s deci-
sion to give up on shale gas in Sweden was probably more influ-
enced by the disappointing test results than the public controver-
sy its pioneering efforts generated. However, due to the Swedes’ 
ecological attitude, underdeveloped gas demand, and the greener 
supply alternatives the country has, there is limited appeal for 
pushing risky technologies. 
In Denmark and Sweden alike, communities and NGOs have 
organized themselves against the development of unconventional 
gas. They take part in, and push for, a general debate. It can be 
observed and forecasted that public acceptance is a critical factor. 
Information is key, but one very open question is whether and 
how concrete benefits to the communities could be offered. If so, 
this might help convincing citizens. These benefits can be in the 
form of financial benefits or funding for the municipality – as 
discussed intensely in Britain (Natural Gas Europe, 2013). One 
benefit that the publics in Denmark and Sweden generally ex-
pect, however, is that unconventional gas development should 
have positive, rather than negative, effects on the environment – 
such as a reduction of CO2 emissions in the climate protection 
context. Scandinavia is likely, and well-advised, to be very care-
ful weighing these arguments.  
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